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JOHN LOCKE 



AND 



FORMAL DISCIPLINE 



A THESIS 

Presented to the General Faculty of the 
University of Virginia 

IN Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 

BY 

Frederick Arthur Hodge 

professor of 
Psychology and Education 



WiNTHROP Normal and Industrial College 
Rock Hill. South Carolina 



JOHN LOCKE 



AND 



FORMAL DISCIPLINE 



A THESIS 



Presented to the General Faculty of the 
University of Virginia 

IN Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 

BY 

Frederick Arthur Hodge 

professor of 
Psychology and Education 



WiNTHROP Normal and Industrial College 
Rock Hill, South Carolina 



LYNCHBURG, VIRGINIA : 
J. P. Bell Company, Inc., Printers and Binders 
1911 



L3A^^, 



,\_fc 



^1 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



PAGE 

I. Pkeliminary Statement 3 

II. Locke's Histoeical and Philosophical Backgeound 6 

III. Soueces for Locke's Educational Docteines 12 

IV. The Essay and Foemal Discipline 14 

V. Logic and Mathematics as a Discipline of Reason. . 20 

YI. Ee-Interpeetation of Locke's Views 27 

Bibliography 31 



I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 

Modern education is no exception to that law of development by 
which the new must be entered through the medium of the old. 
Classicism had to yield to naturalism and realism, as scholasticism 
had given way to the renaissance. But progress ever comes through 
readjustment, and- it was in the effort to readjust classical training 
to the demands of the renaissance, that the doctrine of formal disci- 
pline was brought forth. This doctrine, in its broader form, held 
that mental activity leads to mental power, and power so gained 
may be used on any kind of subject-matter with equal facility. 
The aim of education, therefore, should be the learning process, 
not the thing learned.^ 

It is not the purpose of the present paper to engage in polemics 
over this already much belabored dogma, but rather to attempt a 
re-interpretation of the views of one, who, although he prepared 
the way for the overthrow of formal discipline, has notwithstand- 
ing, often been classed by educational writers as a leading pro- 
mulgator of it. There are, in fact, but few men who have been 
used as the scapegoat for so many varying theories as John Locke. 
In the words of Professor Adams :^ "Almost every philosopher who 
writes a book feels compelled to dispose of Locke first: . . . 
Though they spend all their introductory chapters in showing how 
Locke went wrong, philosophers do not seem to be able to get 
along without him." 

It has thus come to pass that Locke stands identified with many 
opinions which are contrary to the whole tenor of his thinking. 
It also frequently occurs that what was intended by him merely 
as a side-light, or as illustrative material, has been used as his 
central thought. A few of the many interpretations of Locke by 
leading educational writers will serve to show the difference in 
opinion concerning his classification. 



^Monroe's "Text-Book in the Hist, of Ed.," p. 596. 
"'Herbartian Psychology Applied to Education," p. 32. 



Oscar Browning^ divides educators into three schools : humanists, 
realists and naturalists, and puts Locke in the last class. 

Quick- notes two classes, utilitarians and mental trainers. He 
places Locke with the latter, inasmuch as he is not so much con- 
cerned with results in a practical way, as with discipline. 

Compayre^ finds the opposing classes in realists and formalists, 
and places Locke with the former class. 

Paul Monroe* sees in Locke traces of the realist and the natural- 
ist, but, above all, he uses him as the chief representative of tlie 
disciplinary conception in education. 

Williams^ finds in him a "pronounced utilitarian;'' and S. S. 
Laurie*' an incomplete humanivst. 

Amid these varying estimates there seems to run but one common 
thought — the disciplinary character of education, according to 
Locke. Compayre is, apparently, the only exception. He, however, 
makes no attempt to free Locke from the dogma attributed to him 
by the others, but, stressing a slightly different phase of Locke's 
work, classes him with the realists instead of the formalists. 

The question of correctly interpreting Locke does not differ 
much from the same problem with relation to any other writer, 
except in degree. With him, individual statements mean possibly 
less, and the entire system more, than with most writers. This has 
been clearly expressed by Lewes.'' 

'"There is no excuse for not understanding Locke. If his 
language be occasionally loose and wavering, his meaning is 
always to be gathered from the context. He had not the lucidity 
of Descartes or Hobbes; but he was most anxious to make himself 
intelligible, and to this end he varied his expressions, and stated 
his meaning in a variety of forms. He must not be taken literally. 
Xo single passage is to be relied on, unless it be also borne out by 



^"Educational Theories," pp. 85 ft". 

^''Educational Reformers," pp. 234 ff. 

'"'Hist, of Pedagogy;" Tr. by W. H. Payne, §210. 

^"Text-Book in the Hist, of Ed.," pp. 505 flf. 

'"Hist, of Modern Ed.," pp. 193 ff. 

""Educational Opinion from the Renaissance," p. 233. 

^"Biographical Hist, of Phil.," vol. 2, p. 534. 



the whole tenor of his speculations. Any person merely 'dipping 
into' the Essay will find passages which seem very contradictory: 
any person carefully reading it through will find all clear and 
coherent." 

It will be the aim of this paper to interpret Locke's educational 
views in harmony with his philosophy. Indeed, I am convinced 
that only by so doing can his real meaning be made manifest. 
He was primarily a philosopher, and his greatest work, "The 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding," is a statement of his 
philosophical views. Of the three works written by him, with 
which we shall be principally concerned, the "Essay" is the only 
one that may be called a finished product. His "Thoughts Con- 
cerning Education," was written to a friend concerning the educa- 
tion of his son. The "Conduct of the Understanding," from which 
most of Locke's formal discipline is culled, was an afterthought 
which Locke intended for an additional chapter to the "Essay." 
It was never put in final form by him, and was first published in 
a volume of posthumous works. 

Professor Paul Monroe says of "Thoughts Concerning Educa- 
tion:"^ "It is entirely one-sided to formulate Locke's educational 
ideas from this one treatise, the more so since it contains advice 
written to a friend concerning the education of his own sons and 
it is specifically stated by Locke that much of it has only this 
special application." Again he says;- "Though it is impossible to 
enter into details here, it must be borne in mind that Locke's 
philosophical and psychological views do not always accord with 
his views on education." 

It is but just to any writer, that his views be harmoniously 
interpreted when possible. The task before us is limited to the 
re-interpretation of that part of Locke's system which, in the eyes 
of educators, seems to sanction the dogma of formal discipline. If 
it shall be found that the discrepancy between his philosophy and 
education, pointed out by Professor Monroe, appears in connection 
with this dog-ma, a re-interpretation may serve at once to remove 
Locke from the ranks of the disciplinarians and to harmonize his 
entire system of the origin and development of knowledge. 



"'Text-Book in the Hist, of Ed.," p. 513. 
=Ibid. 



II. LOCKE'S HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
BACKGROUND 

The educational doctrine wliich based the curriculum on the 
supposed values of studies, was, in its earlier days, part of the 
educational system known as Humanism. During it's first period, 
from the middle of the fourteenth to the middle of the fifteenth 
centuries. Humanism represented a real revival of learning. "It 
was, however, inevitable," says Laurie,^ "that in seeking for an 
expression of Life and Art, the more active minds should be drawn 
to what was ready-made, but had been forgotten. Latin literature, 
and, subsequently, the study of Greek, accordingly, were the two 
great occupations of the Humanists. From the ancient classics 
they sought to revivify the Socratic teaching that 'knowledge is 
virtue.' " 

Petrus Vergerius (1349 — ), a thorough Humanist, in writing of 
liberal studies, says;- "We call those studies liberal which are 
worthy of a free man ; those studies by which we attain and practice 
virtue and wisdom; that education which calls forth, trains and 
develops those highest gifts of body and of mind which ennoble 
men." 

Between these views and those of the later Humanists there is a 
very decided difference. The first century of Humanism had 
breadth of view and the spirit of real scholarship. They turned 
to the classics because these had meaning for life : they refused 
to be bound by scholasticism with its vapid show of reason, its 
acceptance and confirmation of received doctrines, and its perfect 
contentment with its own educational status. "In this difference," 
says Woodward,'^ "is implied a constant process in which the ideal 
of the greater Humanists was slowly narrowed and hardened till 
it reaches the pedantry which rouses the scorn of Montaigne. It 



'"Ed. Opinion from the Renaissance," p. 0. 

""De Ingenxiis Moribus," Tr. by Woodward in '"Vittorino Da Feltre and 
Other Humanist Educators," p. 102. 

^"Vittorino Da Feltre and Other Humanist Educators," Intro, p. viii. 



is not merely that the Latinity of Vergerius or Giiarino was freer 
and less artificial, nor that with them literature was something 
more than a sequence of model passages: the scholars of the first 
half of the Quattrocento had a far broader grasp of the true content 
of education, and with it a more sincere conception of the relation 
between the antique and the modern world." 

"The narrowing of the educational aim and the return to mere 
verbalism was, in truth, not long of coming. If it be the essence 
of Humanism in its larger meaning, that it was the opening of 
men's eyes afresh to nature and life, the exhaustion of the new 
movement can be easily understood. For it is given to few men, 
and those chiefly of poetic temperament, to keep their eyes open 
for long. There is an instinctive craving for dogma and form; 
for without these there is no intellectual repose."^ 

By the sixteenth century this tendency toward intellectual repose 
and dogmatism had obscured the early Humanistic aims: "that 
which was at first merely a means came to be considered as an end 
in itself. The term Humanities came to indicate the language and 
literature of the ancients. Consequently, the aim of education was 
thought of in terms of language and literature instead of in terms 
of life: the educational effort was directed toward the mastery 
of this literature. That portion of these literatures which was 
superior from the formal standpoint became the center of educa- 
tional effort. Consequently the formal, instead of the content or 
literary side of these writings, was considered to be of the greater 
importance. This change, though a gradual one, resulted in the 
formulation of a type of education distinct from and inferior to 
the liberal education out of which it grew."^ Educational thought 
became centered in the triviuni and quadrivium of Scholasticism, 
and, even the studies included in these were taught for their 
value as mental disciplines rather than for anything contained in 
them. 

During the Middle Ages and the early period of Humanism, 
Latin had not been studied for its cultural value alone. It had 
also a practical, utilitarian value.^ It was the key that unlocked 



"'Ed. Opinion from the Renaissance," p. 28. 

^Monroe's "Brief Course in the Hist, of Ed.," p. 170. 

^Cf. Jos. Payne's "Lectures on the Hist, of Ed.," vol. 2. p. 35. 



every door. It was the language of all education. Woodward 
emphasizes this fact in the following passage.^ 

"But apart from the broader effects of classical culture it was 
held that on nearly every side of practical life the best guidance 
attainable was to be derived from the study of ancient books. 
Aristotle's Politics is the soundest manual of statecraft : Vegetius 
and Caesar are the best guides to the Art of War; Virgil, to agri- 
culture. In ruling a household, Cicero, Plutarch, Upon Education, 
and Francesco Barbaro, whose work De Re Uxoria was regarded 
as worthy of a place in the noble company, could be safely relied 
upon. In all departments of government, in war, justice, council, 
and domestic policy. Literature is the one sure course of practical 
wisdom." 

At this early day there was no distinction between the elements 
that made for culture and those that made for utility. But when 
the scientific awakening of Bruno and Bacon, of Copernicus and 
Galileo usliered in a thousand insistent demands for practical 
scientific training, the whole system of educational values was 
changed. The classics could not longer fulfill the demand for 
practical values and the Humanists began to urge their cultural 
values. 

The claim of the classics to cultural values was not founded 
upon demonstration, but upon authority. Studies which had 
produced such civilizations could not be called in question. Even 
if they were inadequate in content no exception could be taken to 
them as mental trainers. Therefore, if a man would excell in 
science, let him first develop Ms power of judgment through the 
classics, and in this way he will best prepare himself for any field 
of investigation. 

Hegius, who presided over the College of Deventer in Holland, 
the first school in the North to adopt the study of Greek after the 
capture of Constantinople, said :- 

"If any one wishes to understand grammar, rhetoric, mathematics, 
history or Holy Scripture, let him learn Greek. We owe everything 
to the Greeks." This idea rapidly became the dominant one, and 
formal discipline intrenched itself in authority. 



^"Vittorino Da Feltre and Other Humanist Educators," p. 184. 
^Jos. Payne's "Lectures on the Hist, of Ed.," vol. 2, p. 37. 



But the sixteenth century saw this dependence upon authority 
assailed on every hand. "The movement away from authority and 
toward freedom, which found expression in the experimental science 
of Bacon and the pedagogy of Comenius, made itself felt in all the 
departments of human life, especially in religion and politics. 
In religion, it produced the Eef ormation ; in politics, that persistent 
tendency to ignore the divine right of kings, and to place the seat 
of authority in the people."^ Finally through the brilliant work 
of Rene Descartes (1606-1659) and John Locke (1632-1704), 
philosophy threw off its yoke. These two men, although so much 
opposed in the general character of their philosophy, have, never- 
theless, as Davidson points out,- one view in common. They both 
refuse to be bound by authority. Descartes makes truth to rest 
upon clearness and distinctness of ideas, while Locke bases it upon 
experience; both deny authority as a valid test. The two types of 
philosophy thus promulgated — rationalism and empiricism — were 
respectively continued; on the continent by the mathematical 
rationalists Spinoza and Leibniz; and in England by B^'keley 
and Hume. In Locke, however, are to be found elements which 
point forward to the final reconciliation in Kant. 

Having rested its claims upon authority, the advocates of formal 
discipline have consistently eschewed all metaphysical alliances. 
But, while belonging to no particular system of philosophy, there 
are some systems better adapted to its claims than others. Thus, 
the faculty psychology of Aristotle formed a very convenient psy- 
chological background for it. For, if the value of the classics lay 
in their disciplinary powers, power gained in the exercise of any 
particular faculty would be beneficial in all other exercises of the 
same faculty. In fastening upon Locke as an exponent of this 
dogma, however, modern writers have failed to take into considera- 
tion the question of its adaptability to liis philosophy. 

Of the two great philosophical systems of Locke's time, viz : 
empiricism and rationalism, the latter affords the better basis for 
the dogma of formal discipline. The whole tendency of empiricism 
is against it, and furnishes the principles for its overthrow. In 



^Davidson's "A History of Education," p. 196. 
=^Ibid, p. 197. 



9 



opposition to the dogma of formal discipline, empiricism sets up 
the doctrine of specific experiences. On the other hand there is a 
presupposition of mental discipline in the fundamental doctrines 
of the mathematical rationalists. They held mathematics to be 
the most perfect and, therefore, the pattern science, and all others 
should be cast in the same mould. Spinoza wrote his Ethics under 
the title, Ethica more geometrica demonstrata. Each book begins 
with definitions and axioms; propositions and proofs follow. 
According to this type of philosophy, mathematics furnished the 
discipline required for ethics and, in fact, for all other sciences. 

Paulsen has shown^ that '^even the cogito ergo sum of Descartes 
together with the deduction therefrom of the existence of God, 
which, in turn, is to form the basis or the certainty of all scientific 
knowledge, is an afterthought' deduced from certain generaliza- 
tions on mathematics as a perfect and, therefore, a pattern science. 
It was probably due only to his craving for mathematics that Des- 
cartes substituted mathematical for classical discipline. The differ- 
ence is in content and not in form or method. 

To what extent Locke was influenced by the Humanism that 
pervaded Oxford while he was a student there, it is impossible to 
say. There is some evidence that he revolted at the narrowness 
and dogmatism of the curriculum. "I have often heard him say," 
Lady Masham reports, "that he had small satisfaction in his Oxford 
studies, as finding very little light brought thereby to his under- 
standing; that he became discontented with his manner of life, 
and wished that his father had rather designed him for anything 
else than what he was destined to."- Again she writes: "The 
first books, as Mr. Locke has told me, which gave him a relish 
of philosophical things were those of Descartes. He was rejoiced 
in reading these, because, though he very often differed in opinion 
from this writer, yet he found that what he said was very intelligi- 
ble; from whence he was encouraged to think that his not having 
understood others had possibly not proceeded from a defect in his 
understanding."^ 



"'Intro, to Phil.," Tr. by Frank Thilly, Book II., note p. 38.3. 
''Fraser's Ed. of Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding," 
Prolegomena, p. xix. 
Tbid, p. XX. 

10 



It may well have been that the center of attraction for Locke, in 
the writings of Descartes, was that freedom from authority which 
has already been mentioned as characteristic of both these men. 
It is certain that Locke found the menu provided by Humanism, 
unappetizing. In his "Thoughts Concerning Education," he 
says :^ 

"But under whose Care soever a Child is put to be taught during 
the tender and flexible years of his Life, this is certain, it should 
be one who thinks Latin and Language the least Part of Educa- 
tion;" and again: 2 "When I consider what ado is made about a 
little Latin and Greek, how many Years are spent at it, and what 
a Noise and Business it makes to no Purpose, I can hardly for- 
bear thinking that the Parents of Children still live in fear of the 
school-masters Rod, which they look on as the only Instrument of 
Education; as a language or two to be its whole Business." 

Locke did not advocate the abolition of the classics from the 
schools. He thought they were necessary for a gentleman's son, 
but that altogether too much attention was paid to this limited 
sphere. 

These quotations in connection with the testimony of Lady 
Masham, indicate that Locke's free spirit revolted at the dogmatism 
of Humanism, and led him to break with this traditional authority 
in formulating his educational system. Wliether he broke with 
Humanism in toto, or only so far as the classics were concerned, 
will be considered later. Before entering upon a discussion of his 
system we shall briefly notice our sources. 

>§177. 
^§147. 



11 



III. SOURCES FOR LOCKE'S EDUCATIONAL 
DOCTRINES 

The sources for the study of Locke's educational views are the 
"Essay Concerning Human Understanding;" "Thoughts Concern- 
ing Education;" "Conduct of the Understanding;" and a short 
essay "Of Study." 

The "Essay Concerning Human Understanding" was the great- 
est and most careful piece of work of his life. In an introductory 
chapter he details the events that started him upon this inquiry. 
A few friends having met in Locke's chamber, probably during 
the winter of 1670-1671 became involved in a discussion Avhich 
could only be settled by a criticism of the knowing faculties. Locke 
set liimself to this task and after eighteen years of labor he pub- 
lished the first edition in March, 1690. This was followed by 
other editions, the second in 1694, and the third and fourth in 
1695 and 1700 respectively. Important changes were made and 
new chapters added in both the second and fourth editions. 

"Thoughts Concerning Education" was first published anony- 
mously, in 1693. It was translated into French by Pierre Coste, 
who supplied the name of the author. In later editions, Locke 
signed his own name to the dedicatory letter. S. S. Laurie says;^ 
"I would apologize for the large space I have given to Locke did I 
not think that his Thoughts read along with his Conduct of the 
Understanding is, in spite of some obvious faults the best treatise 
on education which has ever appeared, with the (doubtful) excep- 
tion of Quintillian." 

Quick gives the following account of Locke's purpose in writing 
Thoughts.- "One of Locke's friends in England, Mr. Edward 
Clarke of Chipley, near Taunton, was anxious for advice about the 
bringing up of his son, and, as this problem had been much in 
Locke's thoughts, the philosopher wrote from Holland a series of 
letters on the subject, which, four years after his return to England, 



^"Educational Opinion from the Renaissance," Prefatory note, p. vi. 
^"Loeke on Ed.," Intro, p. xxsvi. 

12 



he was induced to publish as 'Thoughts Concerning Education.' 
No doubt the letters were more elaborate than they would have 
been but for a notion in the writer's mind that they might some 
day be used as material for a treatise. . . . As he afterwards 
found no time to work up these letters into a regular dissertation, 
he was content to publish them as thoughts." 

The "Conduct of the Understanding" was originally designed 
as an additional chapter of the Essay. It, however, failed to appear 
in the fourth edition, although previous to the publication of this 
edition, the author had written his intention of including the Con- 
dud, to William Molyn^ux. In fact, this treatise was never 
published nor even revised by Locke, but first appeared in the 
"Posthumous Works of Mr. John Locke," edited anonomously, 
though probably by Peter King, and published in 1706. Of this 
collection the editor says in general that, "for the most part they 
received not the author's last hand, being in a great measure little 
more than sudden views, intended to be afterwards revised and 
farther looked into, but by sickness, intervention of business, 
or preferable enquiries happened to be thrust aside and so lay 
neglected."^ 

The essay "Of Study" was likewise a posthumous publication, 
but is without value for the present inquiiy. 



^Fowler's "Locke's Conduct of the Understanding," Intro, p. xxii. 



13 



IV. THE ESSAY AND FORMAL DISCIPLINE 

In his introduction to the "Essay,"^ Locke states that his purpose 
is to ''inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human 
knowledge." In so far as he finds the "original" of knowledge in 
ideas which are obtained either through sensation or reflection, his 
problem is a psychological one. But in so far as it has to do with 
the validity of knowledge and its extent, the problem is epistemo- 
logical. 

I have already endeavored to show that such a doctrine as that 
of formal discipline could be more readily adapted to some philo- 
sophical systems than to others. It remains to be shown whether 
the epistemology and psychology of Locke furnish us with any 
Grundlehre for such a doctrine. If so, the alleged inconsistency 
between his philosophy and educational theory vanishes. If, on 
the other hand, his philosophical principles offer no foundation 
for formal discipline, we may well look for some other interpre- 
tation of those passages in his other writings wherein, it is claimed, 
the dogma is promulgated. 

In the First Book of the Essay, Locke's purpose is a negative 
one; i. e., to show by reason and a fund of observed facts, that 
none of our ideas may be called innate when such term would 
indicate their origin in the mind apart from experience. He holds 
this as evident because they must either be in the mind at birth, 
or dawn upon it later. That the former is not true is evident, 
because, "to be in the mind" must obviously imply consciousness 
of them, and we know that children are not conscious of many of 
the so-called innate truths, such as mathematical axioms, the law 
of identity, etc. But, if, on the other hand, there is merely a 
capacity for these truths and they themselves dawn later, then, 
not only a part of the things we come to know are innate, but all 
are, and the term, as applied to a restricted class of ideas, loses 
its distinction. 

Wliile the limits of this investigation do not include the primary 
question at issue in the First Book of the Essay, yet there are in 

14 



this discussion epistemological implications that have direct bear- 
ing on our problem. 

Friedrich Paulsen says:^ "Epistemological inquiries culminate 
in two questions: What is the essence, and What is the origin of 
knowledge? What is hnoivledge, and How is l-nowledge acquired f 
In the First Book of the Essay, Locke is concerned with the ques- 
tion of the origin of knowledge. 

Granting, for the moment, the existence of innate ideas, such 
ideas would necessarily be both general and abstract. This would 
posit the existence of general truths in the mind prior to particular 
facts. Locke's basal contention contradicts this. For him "the 
ideas first known are not general axioms and abstract concepts, 
but particular impressions of the senses."^ "The senses at first 
let in particular ideas and furnish the yet empty cabinet, and the 
mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are 
lodged in the memory, and names got to them. Afterwards, the 
mind proceeding further, abstracts them, and by degrees karns 
the use of general names."^ This makes all general truths arise 
from particular experiences by means of abstraction. 

It will be, furthermore, apparent that under the system of innate 
ideas, the original endowment of ideas will form both the basis for 
the aquisition of specific experiences, and the interpreting medium 
of them. Truth and certainty will be attained by reference of 
each experience to some one of these innate truths. But the 
number of these innate ideas must necessarily remain limited. 
Martinean and others have tried to catalog them. If, then, the 
number of experiences may be indefinitely increased while the 
number of general ideas to which they are referred, remains static, 
there will be, of necessity, an extension of the general truths over 
the varied matters of experience. Such an extension of the appli- 
cation of general truths is formal discipline, and this dogma is, 
therefore, a corollary of the doctrine of innate ideas. Moreover, 
in using the relation of particular and general ideas as the basis 
of his attack on innate ideas Locke is forced at the same time to 
strike at the foundation of its corollary, formal discipline. 



^"Intro. to Phil.," Tr. by F. Thilly, Book II., p. 341. 
^Falckenberg's "Hist, of Modern Phil.," Tr. by A. C. Armsti'ong, Jr., 
p. 156. 

^Essaij, Book I., Cliapter 1, §15. 

15 



While it is true that Locke has not criticised innate ideas because 
of the disciplinary concej)tion involved in their application to 
particular facts of experience, he has done that which is of equal 
importance for the purposes of this investigation in taking away 
the ground on which the system rests. He holds that the mind 
is at first a blank. There is no knowledge prior to experience. 
The normal order is from particular to general. Such is the 
system of specific experience that he sets up against or in place 
of that of innate ideas. This doctrine of specific experience as the 
basis of knowledge, does away with both the need for, and the 
possibility of formal discipline. 

The difi^erence in theory between Locke and the advocates of 
innate ideas, however, is more than merely a question of the order 
in which general and particular ^notions are acquired. It is a 
fundamental difl:erence in the conception of the nature of knowl- 
edge. The theory of innate ideas, as also the faculty psychology, 
conceived of the elements of knowledge as static and fixed. Locke 
conceives of them as dynamic. This difi:erence in the nature of 
knowledge as embodied in the rival systems is clearly pointed out 
by AVeber. He says :^ 

"The fact is if truth is native to the mind, it is useless to search 
for it outside by observation and experimentation. Then we may, 
l)y means of a priori speculation, meditation, and reasoning, evolve 
it from our own inner consciousness, as the spider spins its web 
out of itself. This hypothesis Descartes consistently carries out 
when he 'closes his eyes and stops his ears,' and abstracts from 
everything acquired by the senses; but he ceases to be consistent 
when he assiduously devotes himself to the study of anatomy and 
physiology. Indeed, the favorite method of the metaphysics of 
the monasteries and universities was to close one's eyes, to stop 
one's ears, and to ignore the real world. This method prevailed 
as long as the conviction existed that our ideas have their source 
within us. Hence, it was necessary, in order to make the philoso- 
phers 'open their eyes to the real world,' to prove to them that 
all our ideas come to us from without, through the medium of 
sensation: it was necessary to demonstrate that our ideas are not 
innate but acquired." 



^Weber's "Hist, of Phil.," Tr. by Frank Thilly, p. 371. 

16 



Having found nothing in Locke's epistemology that warrants the 
attribution to him of the doctrine of formal discipline we will now 
proceed to examine his psychology. The theory of an original 
mental endowment in ideas differs but little, in Locke's point of 
view, from the theory of an original endowment of mental faculties. 
In fact the two theories go hand in hand, the first, however, being 
more of an epistemology by nature, and the latter, a psychology. 
The doctrine of innate ideas involves a discipline of material 
elements, while the faculty psychology involves a discipline of 
formal elements. The former makes necessary the extension of 
the application of general truths, the latter extends the application 
of mental powers. A criticism of innate ideas, therefore, from the 
standpoint of their disciplinary application as general truths is 
likewise a criticism of the faculty psychology from the same stand- 
point. Locke, however, is commonly taken as an advocate of the 
faculty psychology, either because he is commonly accepted as an 
advocate of formal discipline, and the one implies the other; or 
because of his frequent use of the terminology current among 
the faculty psychologists. 

Mr. Adams, while paying the highest tributes to Locke, voices 
the commonly accepted view of his psychology. He says:^ 

"The English philosopher got rid of innate ideas, but he could 
not free himself from innate faculties. What Locke did for innate 
ideas Herbart did for innate faculties. Burdened by his assump- 
tion of successive states, Locke could not get his ideas to work 
upon each other in order to produce complex actions and reactions. 
He was therefore driven to invent or assume certain powers of 
the mind which he called faculties, and which were credited with 
all the work that went on within the mind. When a certain pro- 
cess was discovered, by the act of introspection to take place in the 
mind, Locke and his followers gave this process a name, and then 
assumed a faculty corresponding to that name. A certain process 
called abstraction is discovered to go on within the mind. This 
gives the introspectionist no trouble. It is only a matter of baptiz- 
ing another faculty, and we have the 'faculty of abstraction.' 
Against this short and easy method Herbart made a vigorous pro- 
test and swept away forever from his Philosophy the whole brood 
of faculties." 



'"Heibartian Psy. Applied to Ed.," p. 47. 

17 



On tliis point Locke displays his usual good sense, and one can- 
not but feel that, not only did he see the difficulty clearly, but his 
treatment of it, avoiding as it does all metaphysical speculation, 
is greatly preferable to that of Herbart. To say the least, Locke, 
more than a century before the German psychologist, did free him- 
self from what Mr. Adams above terms "innate faculties," and in 
so doing opened a path for the rest of the thinking world. 

We will let Locke argue his own case. He says :^ 

"For, if it be reasonable to suppose and talk of faculties as 
distinct beings that can act (as we do, when we say the will orders, 
and the will is free), it is fit that we should make a speaking 
faculty, and a walking faculty, and a dancing faculty, by which 
these actions are produced. . . . And we may as properly 
say that it is the singing faculty sings, and the dancing faculty 
dances, as that the will chooses, or that the understanding con- 
ceives; or, as is usual, that the will directs the understanding, or 
the understanding obeys or obeys not the will: it being altogether 
as proper and intelligible to say that the power of speaking directs 
the power of singing, or the power of singing obeys or disobeys the 
power of speaking. 

"This way of talking, nevertheless, has prevailed, and, as I guess, 
produced great confusion. For these being all different powers 
in the mind, or in the man, to do several actions, he exerts them 
as he thinks fit; but the power to do one action is not operated 
on by the power of doing another action. 

"The attributing to faculties that which belonged not to them, 
has given occasion to this way of talking; but the introducing into 
discourses concerning the mind, with the name of faculties, a 
notion of their operating, has, I suppose, as little advanced our 
knowledge in that part of ourselves, as the great use and mention 
of the like invention of faculties, in the operations of the body, 
has helped us in the knowledge of physic. Not that I deny there 
are faculties, both in the body and mind : they both of them have 
their powers of operating, else neither the one nor the other could 
operate. For nothing can operate that is not able to operate; and 
that is not al)le to operate that has no power to operate. Nor do I 
deny that those words, and the like, are to have their place in the 



'Essay, Book II., Chapter xxi, §17-20. 

18 



common use of languages that have made them current. It looks 
like too much affectation wholly to lay them by; and philosophy 
itself, though it likes not a gaudy dress, yet, when it appears in 
public, must have so much complacency as to be clothed in the 
ordinary fashion and language of the country, so far as it can 
consist with truth and perspicuity. But the fault has been, that 
faculties have been spoken of and represented as so many distinct 
agents. For it being asked, what it was that digested the meat in 
our stomachs? It was a ready and very satisfactory answer to 
say that it was the digestive faculty. What it was that made any- 
thing come out of the body? the expulsive faculty. Wliat moved? 
the motive faculty. And so in the mind, the intellectual faculty, 
or the understanding, understood; and the elective faculty, or 
the will, willed or commanded. This is, in short, to say, that the 
ability to digest, digested; and the ability to move, moved; and 
the ability to understand, understood. For faculty, ability, and 
power, I think, are but different names of the same things; which 
ways of speaking, when put into more intelligible words, will, I 
think, amount to thus much; — That digestion is performed by 
something that is able to digest, motion by something able to move, 
and understanding by something able to understand. And, in 
truth, it would be very strange if it should be otherwise ; as strange 
as it would be for a man to be free without being able to be free." 

It would be difficult to conceive of a more complete refutation 
of the old faculty psychology than the above. It is the thought 
of the philosopher put into the language of the plain man, and 
there is no occasion for stumbling. He is willing to hold to the 
term faculty, meaning by it any ahility to do anything, but rejects 
it in the more distinctive humanistic sense. Instead of restricting 
these so-called faculties to a limited number he makes their num- 
ber as unlimited as actions are varied. In calling Locke's faculties, 
innate, Adams would have to call all action innate, and would 
commit the same fallacy as Locke himself criticized in the advocates 
of innate ideas; viz., that to make them all innate destroys the 
notion of them as a separate class. This, then, is Locke's solution 
of the problem. By making faculty, the power to act, he destroys 
faculties as a limited class, and, as has been already noted under 
general notions, the extension of a limited power to act through 
formal discipline is made unnecessary. In so far, then, as formal 
discipline rests on the faculty psychology, the empirical psychology 
of Locke offers it no support. 

19 



V. LOGIC AND MATHEMATICS AS A DISCIPLINE OF 

REASON 

We are now ready for a re-interpretation of some of the passages, 
especially from the "Conduct of the Understanding," which have 
been most frequently quoted as evidence of Locke's disciplinary 
view of education. It is generally thought that Locke merely sub- 
stituted mathematics for the classics as a means of discipline. 
Under the faculty psychology, the reasoning faculty lield highest 
place, and the study of logic and mathematics was considered the 
best means of training it. Locke's position on the disciplinary value 
of these subjects should, therefore, be decisive as to Ms doctrine, and 
especially so in as much as the passages most often quoted to show 
his disciplinary conception, are on the subject of mathematics. 

The Schoolmen were strong advocates of Logic as a means of 
training the reason. It had held honored place in the trivium. 
We will, therefore, let Locke's estimate of logical values speak for 
itself. In the introduction to the Conduct, he says:^ 

"The logic now in use has so long possessed the chair, as the only 
art taught in the schools for the direction of the mind in the study 
of the arts and sciences, that it would perhaps be thought an affecta- 
tion of novelty to suspect that rules that have served the learned 
world these two or three thousand years, and which, without any 
complaint of defects, the learned have rested in, are not sufficient 
to guide the understanding." Here he quotes from Lord Verulam, 
who says : 

"They who attributed so much to logic perceived very well and 
truly that it was not safe to trust the understanding to itself, with- 
out the guard of any rules. But the remedy reached not the evil; 
but became a part of it ; for the logic which took place, though it 
might be well enough in civil affairs and the arts which consisted 
in talk and opinion, yet comes very far short of subtil ity in the real 
performances of nature, and, catching at what it can not reach, 
has served to confirm and establish errors, rather than to open a 
way to truth." 



^Fowler's Ed. "Conduct of the Understanding," p. 4. 

20 



In the Tourth Book of the Essay, under the chapter on Eeason, 
the anthor enters into an elaborate discussion of the syllogism. 
He here sets forth that any one, in reasoning on every-day matters, 
does not put his reasoning in syllogistic form. He does not deny 
that the "syllogism is made use of, on occasion, to discover a 
fallacy hid in a rhetorical flourish, or cunningly wrapt up in a 
smooth period ; and stripping an absurdity of the cover of wit and 
good language, show it in its naked deformity."^ 

But the fallacy, in this case, 'is apparent only to those who have 
thoroughly studied mode and figure, owing to the artificial form 
into which it must be put.' 

"All," he continues,- "who have so far considered syllogism, as 
to see the reason why in three propositions laid together in one 
form, the conclusion will be certainly right, but in another not 
certainly so, I grant are certain of the conclusion they draw from 
the premises in the allowed modes and figures. But they who 
have not so far looked into those forms, are not sure by virtue of 
syllogism, that the conclusion certainly follows from the premises; 
they only take it to be so by an implicit faith in their teachers 
and a confidence in those forms of argumentation; but this is 
still but believing, not being certain. Now, if, of all mankind 
those who can maJie syllogisms are extremely few in comparison 
of those who cannot ; and if, of those few who have been taught 
logic, there is but a very small number who do any more than 
believe that syllogisms, in the allowed modes and figures do con- 
clude right, without knowing certainly that they do so; if syl- 
logisms must be taken for the only proper instrument of reason 
and means of knowledge, it will follow, that, before Aristotle, 
there was not one man that did or could know anything by reason; 
and that, since the invention of syllogisms there is not one of ten 
thousand that doth. 

"But God has not been so sparing to men to make them barely 
two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make them rational ; 
i. e., those few of them that he could get so to examine the grounds 



^Essay, Book IV., Chapter xvii, §4. 
=Ibia. 

21 



of syllogisms, as to see that, in above three-score ways that three 
propositions may be laid together, there are but about fourteen 
wherein one may be sure that the conclusion is right; and upon 
what grounds it is, that, in these few, the conclusion is certain, 
and in the other not. God has been more bountiful to mankind than 
so. He has given them a mind that can reason, without being 
instructed in methods of syllogizing; the understanding is not 
taught to reason by these rules; it has a native faculty to perceive 
the coherence or incoherence of its ideas, and can range them right, 
without any such perplexing repetitions. I say not this any way 
to lessen Aristotle, whom I look on as one of the greatest men 
amongst the ancients." 

He next shows that the syllogism is based on an act of the 
mind which we term inference, but inference really precedes the 
making of the syllogism; for it is evident that the logician sees the 
"connexion of each intermediate idea with those it stands between 
(on which the force of the inference depends), as well before as 
after the syllogism is made, or else they do not see it at all. For 
a syllogism neither shows nor strengthens the connexions of any 
two ideas immediately put together, but only by the connexion seen 
in them shows what connexion the extremes have one with another. 
But what connexion the intermediate has with either of the 
extremes in the syllogism, that no syllogism does nor can show."^ 

He, therefore, shows that before the logician can put propositions 
into syllogistic form he must first have seen the connection between 
the middle term and the other two terms, and, when this is seen, 
the reasoning is passed upon as either good or bad, so the syllogism 
comes too late to settle the matter. 

It is right at this stage that Locke reveals the presence of a 
power which he has previously called by the name, Sagacity. The 
same word is used in the same connection by William James in his 
justly celebrated chapter on Reasoning.- Locke defines it as a 
"quickness of the mind to find out and apply intermediate ideas ;"^ 
and again as the "faculty which finds out while inference sets in 



^Ibid. 

^"Psychology," vol. 2, p. 331. 

'Essay, Book IV., Chapter ii, §3. 



22 



order the intermediate ideas in the chain of truth."^ Logical acu- 
men, therefore, for Locke, depends upon the sagacity of the logician 
in seeing the connection between his terms, before putting them to- 
gether. James has the same thought in making sagacity in the 
selection of premises, the chief thing in reasoning. But neither 
hold sagacity to be a subject of logical discipline. It is first of 
all a natural endo'WTnent, but capable of development in a manner 
which will soon be demonstrated. 

If, then, the perception of logical relations depends on sagacity, 
and is not to be had from practice in the construction of logical 
syllogisms, 'of what use are syllogisms ?' Locke answers :- "Their 
chief and main use is in the Schools, where men are allowed with- 
out shame to deny the agreement of ideas that do manifestly 
agree ; or out of the Schools, to those who from thence have learned 
without shame to deny the connexion of ideas, which even to 
themselves is visible." 

Notwithstanding this severe arraignment of the syllogism, in 
his "Second Vindication of the Eeasonableness of Christianity," 
published in 1697, Locke says that, "If he (Mr. Edwards) can 
but find arguments to prove his propositions that will bear the 
test of setting down in form, and will so publish them, I will allow 
myself to be mistaken. Nay, which is more, if he or anybody, 
in the 113 pages of his Socinianism Unmasl'ed, can find but ten 
arguments that will bear the test of syllogism — the true touchstone 
of right arguing — I will grant that that treatise deserves all those 
recommendations he has bestowed upon it."^ 

This makes it evident that Locke did not discredit the syllo- 
gistic logic per se, but, as indicated above, it was its use in the 
Schools coupled with the extravagant claims made for it as a mental 
discipline that led to his attack. He saw clearly the artificiality 
of the system and the need for a more vital training in reasoning 
than that offered by the Schoolmen. Their logic was a mere thing 
of rules, of figure and mode; it was abstract, and neither sought 
nor found living relationship with concrete existence. He showed 
the necessity for such a relation. The logic that lacked concrete- 



^Essay, Book IV., Chapter xvii, §3. 

^Ibid., Chapter xvii, §4. 

^Vide C. Eraser's Ed. Essay, vol. 2, note p. 307. 



23 



ness was worthless, simply a mental gymnastic. It was to overcome 
this defect that Locke used mathematics as a concrete embodiment 
of logical principles. 

That Locke was a believer in education by concrete experiences 
rather than by abstract laws, is evidenced by the following passage 
from "Thoughts Concerning Education :"^ 

"I have seldom or never observed any one to get the Skill of 
Reasoning well, or Speaking handsomely, by studying those Rules 
which pretend to teach it: And therefore I would have a young 
Gentleman take a view of them in the shortest Systems could be 
found, without dwelling long on the Contemplation and Study of 
those Formalities. Right Reasoning is founded on something 
else than the Predicaments and Predicables, and does not consist 
in talking in Mode and Figure itself. But 'tis beside my present 
Business to enlarge upon this Speculation. To come therefore 
to what we have in hand : if you would have your Son reason well, 
let him read Chillingtvorth ; and if you would have his speak well, 
let him be conversant in Tully, to give him the true Idea of Elo- 
quence ; and let him read those Things that are well writ in 
English, to perfect his Style in the Purity of our Language." 

Just as Locke would use Chilling worth for examples of reason- 
ing in the concrete, so he would use mathematics. He says in the 
"Conduct of the Understanding:"^ 

''Would you have a man reason well, you must use him to it 
betimes, exercise his mind in observing the connection of ideas 
and following them in train. Nothing does this better than 
mathematics, which, therefore, I think should be taught all those 
who have the time and opportunity, not so much to make them 
mathematicians as to make them reasonable creatures; for though 
we all call ourselves so, because we are born to it if we please, yet 
we may truly say nature gives us but the seeds of it; we are born 
to be, if we please, rational creatures, but it is use and exercise 
only that makes us so, and we are indeed so no farther than in- 
dustry and application has carried us. And, therefore, in ways 
of reasoning which men have not been used to, he that will observe 
the conclusions they take up must be satisfied they are not at all 
rational." 



^§188. 

^Fowler's "Locke's Conduct of the Understanding," p. 20. 

24 



In connection with this last sentence he proceeds in the next 
paragraph to say : that men who are reasonable in some things are 
frequently not at all so in others; and, moreover, 'men who may 
reason well in one sort of matters to-day, may not do so at all a 
year hence.' This recognizes that the power to reason is specific 
and not generalized. 

In the following section he continues the same general subject, 
and referring to the above quotation, continues :^ 

I have mentioned mathematics as a way to settle in the mind a 
habit of reasoning closely and in train ; not that I think it necessary 
that all men should be deep mathematicians, but tliat having got 
the way of reasoning, which that study necessarily brings the mind 
to, they might be able to transfer it to other parts of knowledge as 
they shall have occasion. For, in all sorts of reasoning, every single 
argument should be managed as a mathematical demonstration, 
the connection and dependence of ideas should be followed till 
the mind is brought to the source on which it bottoms and observes 
the coherence all along." 

On the surface this reads very much like the dogma of formal 
discipline, but such an interpretation would be out of harmony 
with the tenor of Locke's entire system, as has been shown. To 
interpret this passage in sympathy with the whole trend of Locke's 
teaching, it is only necessary to point out that he would have 
all men study mathematics because of a certain method used therein. 
This method, he claims, is indispensable to all correct reasoning 
in that it exhibits the connection and dependence of ideas. 

In this same connection he goes on to elaborate the benefits to 
be derived from the study of mathematics: "The study of mathe- 
matics would show them the necessity there is, in reasoning, to 
separate all the distinct ideas, and see the habitudes that all those 
concerned in the present inquiry have to one another, and to lay 
by those which relate not to the proposition in hand and wholly 
to leave them out of the reckoning. This is that which in other 
subjects, besides quantit}', is what is absolutely requisite to just 
reasoning, though in them it is not so easily observed nor so care- 
fully practiced. In those parts of knowledge where it is thought 

»Ibid, p. 23. 

25 



demonstration has nothing to do, men reason as it were in the 
lump ; and, if, upon a summary and confused view or upon a par- 
tial consideration, they can raise the appearance of a probability, 
they usually rest content." 

Turning now to the Essay we tind in the chapter on Reason, 
already referred to, the very core of Locke's preference for mathe- 
matics over logic as a developer of the reason. He says -} 

"We may in reason consider these four degrees; the first and 
highest is the discovering and finding out of truths; the second, 
the regular and methodical disposition of them, and laying them 
in a clear and fit order, to make their connexion and force be 
plainly and easily perceived; the third is the perceiving their con- 
nexion; and the fourth, a making a right conclusion. These 
several degrees may be observed in any mathematical demonstra- 
tion ; it being one thing to perceive the connexion of each part, as 
the demonstration is made by another; another to perceive the 
dependence of the conclusion on all the parts; a third, to make 
out a demonstration clearly and neatly one's self; and something 
different from all these, to have first found out these intermediate 
ideas or proofs by which it is made." 

He then proceeds to show that 'syllogism serves our reason in 
only one of the four degrees mentioned; i. e., by showing the con- 
nexion of proofs in any one instance, but in no more.'- 

Locke's preference for mathematics as a mental trainer, may be 
summed up in the following points: (1.) It separates the ideas 
to be reasoned about, thus avoiding confusion: (2.) It arranges 
the truths to be used, in order, so that their connection may be 
readily seen: (3.) It exhibits the relations of the conclusion to 
all the parts: and (-i.) It furnishes concrete demonstrations of 
logical inference. So far, then, as mathematics supplies a method 
of reasoning, which may be used in reasoning upon other things, 
it is not at all necessary that its value be construed as disciplinary. 



^Essay, Book IV., Chapter xvii, §3. 
^Ibid, §4. 



2% 



VI. RE-INTERPRETATION OF LOCKE'S VIEWS 

Practically all the modern writers against the theory of formal 
discipline admit, in one form or another, that while in education 
the emphasis must be placed on the specific character of mental 
training, yet, there are some generalized benefits to be derived. 
In a recent work, in which the views on this subject are sum- 
marized, Professor Heck gives the views of a number of leading 
educational writers as to the character and extent of such general 
benefits, as follows :^ 

"Bagley says through 'a general ideal of work;' Bennett, 
through "knowledge or ideal consciously generalized;' Lewis, 
through 'educating the will by inculcating some general principle 
or motive of conduct'; Home, through 'ideas and principles of 
action;' Thorndike, through 'identity of procedure;' Ruediger, 
through 'identity of aim.' " 

Heck sums up these general benefits under the term, "Concepts 
of Method." Of them he says :- 

"A general benefit can be derived from specific training in so far 
as the person trained has consciously wrought out, in connection 
with the specific training, a general concept of method, based upon 
the specific methods used in that training. The building of such 
a concept follows the same laws as does the building of other con- 
cepts. The common elements in a number of specific methods are 
abstracted and bound together in a general concept of method, a 
general rule or principle of how to do, how to act, in situations of 
a certain general type. These concepts may be held in the mind 
in one or more sentences, in a single phrase or a single word, in 
a m.etaphor or a line of poetry or some traditional maxim, in a 
formula of mathematics or chemistry or engineering. In all cases 
the symbol stands for a method of activity, be it in the realms of 
pure or applied natural science, of social science or practical civics, 
of business or professional life, of personal manner or social 

'"Mental Discipline and Educational Values," p. 80. 
%id, p. 94. 

27 



relations. The mind stores up by means of this symbol the rules 
and directions to guide its activity in adjustment to those phases 
of the environment to which such an activity seems applicable." 

Under such a concept of method we have placed Locke's treat- 
ment of mathematics. There seems, however, at first glance, to 
be but little difference between the older dogma of formal dis- 
cipline and these newer theories of educational values. The dif- 
ferences might be summed up as follows: (1.) The older theory 
attributed disciplinary values to mental activity on abstract data; 
The new insists that such values are only to be had in concrete 
exercises. (2.) The old theory was that of a general discipline 
of the faculties; i. e., an act of judgment increased the power of 
judgment. The new makes discipline specific ; there is a discipline 
of closely related judgments hut not of the judgment. (3.) There 
is a difference in practical application. The old theory limited the 
subject-matter of mental discipline to a few studies; paramount 
among which were the classics. The new theory, because of its 
ideal of specific disciplines, insists on training in a -wide variety 
of subject-matter. As the discipline has narrowed the subject- 
matter has been broadened. 

It is significant that in each specification, Locke stood on the 
ground now occupied by modern educators in opposition to formal 
discipline. His theory of specific concrete experiences as the source 
of all I'noivledge was the real renaissance in educational theory. If 
Locke's insistence on the study of mathematics is sufficient to 
classify him as an advocate of formal discipline, where must we 
place Herbart, in view of such a passage as the following : 

"As to the middle portion of education, everything might be 
repeated that has ever been said concerning the usefulness of 
mathematics for the cultivation of the mind. Being a gymnastics 
of the thinking powers, iieedful, even in the earlier years of child- 
hood, shall we be able to dispense with it later on? The mind as 
well as the body must from time to time return to its gymnasia in 
order to test its muscles and to renew their perfect elasticity."^ 

Fortunately, the ultimate interpretation of any man's views 
does not depend upon any one or two passages. Herbart's use 



^Herbart's "A. B. C. of Sense Perception," Tr. by William J. Eekoff, p. 150. 

28 



of mathematics as a gymnastics of the thinking powers savors as 
strongly of disciplinary education as does Locke's view of mathe- 
matics as the typical method -of rational procedure. 

Nothing has yet been said concerning Locke's idea of disciplin- 
ing the memory. So far as I have been able to note, those who con- 
sider him as an advocate of formal discipline make no charge of 
it in connection with this faculty. Yet the Humanists looked upon 
the memory as one of the principal subjects of formal discipline. 
Upon this subject, however, Locke has so clearly expressed himself 
as to leave no shadow of doubt concerning his view of it. He says :^ 
"But the learning Pages of Lati7i by Heart, no more fits the 
Memory for Eetention of anything else, than the graving of one 
Sentence in Lead makes it the more capable of retaining firmly 
any other Characters. If such a sort of Exercise of the Memory 
were able to give it Strength, and improve our Parts, Players of all 
other People must needs have the best Memories and be the best 
Company." 

One further passage sometimes quoted from the Conduct- 
demands attention. 

"The business of education, as I have already observed, is not, 
as I think, to make them perfect in any one of the- sciences, but 
so to open and dispose their minds as may best make them capable 
of any, when they shall apply themselves to it. If men are for a 
long time accustomed only to one sort or method of thoughts, 
their minds grow stiff in it, and do not readily turn to another. 
It is, therefore, to give them this freedom, that I think they should 
be made to look into all sorts of knowledge, and exercise their 
understandings is so wide a variety and stock of knowledge. But 
I do not propose it as a variety and stock of knowledge, but a 
variety and freedom of thinking, as an increase of the powers and 
activity of the mind, not as an enlargement of its possessions." 

This is entirely in harmony with the dynamic view of the mind 
already attributed to Locke : That is, to increase the possessions 
of the mind without increasing its ability to react on the data 
it receives would be of no value. He rightly urges that mental 



^Thoughts, §176. 
^Conduct, p. 44. 



29 



ability is to be tested by the power of the mind to grasp new 
situations. But here is where his method of attaining this power 
is seen to differ most radically from the older conception of dis- 
cipline. The old view said : Increase your powers by a few chosen 
studies, and depend upon their general disciplinary powers to 
enable you to grasp new situations of any kind whatsoever. Locke 
says : Increase your powers by a 'variety and freedom of thinking.' 
This can best be attained, not by endeavoring to attain perfection in 
one of the sciences, but by the exercise of the mind in a large 
variety of subject-matter, so that no matter what new experience 
comes knocking at the door, there will be in the mind already 
somewhat to which it can be related. 

This investigation of Locke's attitude toward formal discipline 
will, I believe, justify the following summary, viz. : That the 
evidence adduced tends to show: First, that Locke's philosophy 
and psychology furnish no basis for the dogma in question. 
Second, that he sought to set aside the limited curriculum based 
upon the disciplinary conception of his time, and substitute for it 
a broader curriculum. Third, that he urged the abolition of 
abstract rules and generalizations in favor of concrete specific 
experiences. Fourth, that Locke's various references to education 
as a discipline may best be interpreted in the light of specific dis- 
ciplines and concepts of method, and such interpretation is con> 
sistent with his philosophy. 

From all these conclusions it appears that we are indebted to 
Locke for the grounds upon which the refutation of this dogma has 
been prosecuted. And I, am furthermore convinced that his writ- 
ings contain the fundamentals of the best reform movements in 
education, while his philosophy is set forth in the plain, clear 
language of sound common sense which none can fail to appreciate. 



30 



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King, Lord: The Life and Letters of John Locke. London, 1884. 
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